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COURSE DESCRIPTION AND APPLICATION INFORMATION

Course Name Code Semester T+A+L (hour/week) Type (C / O) Local Credit ECTS
The Comparative Constitutional Theory and Design LAW 361 Fall 02+01+00 Elective 2 5
Academic Unit: Faculty of Law
Mode of Delivery: Face to face
Prerequisites: None
Language of Instruction: English
Level of Course Unit: Undergraduate
Course Coordinator: - -
Course Objectives: The aim of the course is to study political, social, and normative factors that involve constitutional-making processes.
Course Contents: In this course, a series of interesting questions in the field of comparative constitutional law such as why governments bind themselves with constitutional limits; why autocratic leaders empower independent judiciaries to review their actions; and which political factors shape the emergence of different types of constitutional regimes will be discussed. In addition, it will be discussed which constitutional systems are more conducive to democracy and the protection of human rights, and what institutional arrangements can provide stability and peace in ethnically and religiously divided societies.
Learning Outcomes of the Course Unit (LO):
  • 1- Understand the political motives underlying the limitations of governments by constitutions
  • 2- See how and in what ways constitutional institutions can be effective in different societies
  • 3- Understand examples of how autocratic governments instrumentalize constitutions and legal instruments to consolidate their power.
Planned Learning Activities and Teaching Methods: Response Papers and Term Paper


WEEKLY SUBJECTS AND RELATED PREPARATIONS

WeekSubjectsRelated Preperation
1 Introduction: Comparative Constitutionalism -Scheppele, K, L. (2003). The Agendas of Comparative Constitutionalism. Law and Courts, 13, 5-23. -Tushnet, M. (2006). Some Reflections on Method in Comparative Constitutional Law. In Choudhry, S (Eds), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas. (pp.67-83), Cambridge University Press.
2 Constitutions and Constitutionalism -Sartori, G. (1962). Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion. The American Political Science Review, 56(4). -Sajó, A. (1999). Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism. (pp. 50-68), Central European University Press.
3 Constitution Making I -Elster, J. (1995). Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, Duke L.J., 45, p.364. -Partlett, W. (2012). Making Constitutions Matter: The Dangers of Constitutional Politics. In Current Post-Authoritarian Constitution-Making. Brook Journal of Int. Law, 38.
4 Constitution Making II -Lijphart A. (2004). Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy, 15, pp. 96-109. -Choudhry, S. (2008). Bridging comparative politics and comparative constitutional law: constitutional design in divided societies. In Choudhry, S (Eds), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 3-40.
5 Constitutional Rights Regime -Chilton, A., & Versteeg, M. (2020). How Constitutional Rights Matter. OUP.
6 Veto Players and Power Sharing -Tsebelis G. (1995), ‘Decision making in political systems: Veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartitism’, British Journal of Political Science, 25, pp. 289-325. -Ganghof, S. (2003), ‘Premises and Pitfalls of Veto Players’ Analysis, Swiss Political Science Review, pp. 1-25
7 Spring break
8 Constitutional Design: Political System -Mainwaring, S. (1993), ‘Presidentialism, multipartism, and democracy: the difficult combination’, Comparative Political Studies, 26, pp. 198–228. -Shugart M. S. and J. M. Carey (1992), Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional design and Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-27.
9 Constitutional Judicial Review -Ginsburg, T. (2003). Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases. Cambridge University Press. -Hirschl, R. (2004). The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies. 11(1).
10 Judicial Independence -Hilbink, Lisa. 2012. "The origins of positive judicial independence." World Politics 64 (4): 587-621. -Clark, Tom S. 2009. "The separation of powers, court curbing, and judicial legitimacy." American Journal of Political Science 53 (4): 971-989.
11 Constitutional Identity -Jacobsohn, G. J. (2010). Constitutional Identity. Harvard University Press.
12 Authoritarian Constitutionalism -Scheppele, K, L. (2018). Autocratic Legalism. University of Chicago Law Review, 85, p.545. -Landau, D. (2013). Abusive Constitutionalism. UC Davis Law Review, 47, 189–260.
13 Failure of Constitutional Making in Turkey I - Manuscript will be provided
14 Failure of Constitutional Making in Turkey II - Manuscript will be provided


REQUIRED AND RECOMMENDED READING

All course materials will be provided by the lecturer. The students don't need to buy and books etc. For the research on the internet the students should be equipped with a laptop or tablet each lesson.


OTHER COURSE RESOURCES



ASSESSMENT METHODS AND CRITERIA

Semester RequirementsNumberPercentage of Grade (%)
Presentation / Jury 1 60
Extra-Class Activities (reading, individual study etc.) 1 20
Midterms / Oral Exams / Quizes 1 20
Total: 3 100


WORKLOAD

EventsCountDuration (Hours)Total Workload (hour)
Course Hours14228
Project14228
Homework Assigments11414
Preparation for Presentation / Jury2510
Extra-Class Activities (reading,individiual work, etc.)11010
Midterms / Oral Exams / Quizes11010
Total Workload (hour):100


THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COURSE LEARNING OUTCOMES (LO) AND PROGRAM QUALIFICATIONS (PQ)

# PQ1 PQ2 PQ3 PQ4 PQ5 PQ6 PQ7 PQ8 PQ9 PQ10 PQ11 PQ12
LO1                        
LO2                        
LO3